The New Era of Cybersecurity Compliance for Smart Light Strings:
the CRA, ETSI EN 303 645, and the Cyber Trust Mark

When a light string can connect to an app to change color, set schedules and link scenes, it is no longer just a 'light'—it is an IoT device on your home Wi-Fi. And anything that is IoT draws the attention of a growing body of cybersecurity law: the EU's Cyber Resilience Act is already in force, consumer IoT has ETSI's security baseline, and the U.S. has launched the Cyber Trust Mark. This article discusses where cybersecurity compliance for smart light strings should begin.

When a light string can connect to an app to change color, set schedules and link scenes, it is no longer just a ‘light.’

It is an IoT device on your home Wi-Fi. And anything that is IoT draws the attention of a growing body of cybersecurity law: the EU’s Cyber Resilience Act is already in force, consumer IoT has ETSI’s security baseline, and the U.S. has launched the Cyber Trust Mark. This article discusses where cybersecurity compliance for smart light strings should begin.

Why a light string becomes a security problem

First, clarify a concept: what kind of product counts as IoT? The answer is simple—a networkable product that can interact with other devices or networks. When a light string connects to an app or a home network to change color, set schedules and link scenes, it fits that definition completely.

And once networked, it has an attack surface:

• Default passwords: the factory admin/admin is IoT’s most classic entry point
• Firmware vulnerabilities: if the networked module’s software has a flaw and cannot be updated, that is a long-term risk
• Unencrypted communication: if data between app and device travels in plaintext, it can be eavesdropped or tampered with

The worst case for a compromised light string is not just ‘someone messing with the colors’—it is the string becoming a springboard for an attacker into the home network, or being pulled into a botnet. That is why regulators have begun taking networked light strings seriously.

The EU CRA: anything with digital elements is covered

The EU’s heavyweight measure is the Cyber Resilience Act (CRA), that is, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847^[1]. It defines the object of regulation as ‘a product with digital elements’—any hardware or software that can connect directly or indirectly to other devices or networks is within scope. A networked light string is a textbook case.

Its timeline is phased:

• 10 December 2024: the CRA formally entered into force
• 11 September 2026: the reporting obligations for vulnerabilities and incidents begin to apply (manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents to ENISA and national CSIRTs)
• 11 December 2027: the main obligations—including the essential cybersecurity requirements, conformity assessment, CE marking and technical documentation—apply in full

The penalties are not light: violating the essential requirements or manufacturer obligations can be fined up to EUR 15 million or 2.5% of global annual turnover, whichever is higher. The core of the CRA is ‘security by design,’ vulnerability handling, conformity assessment and CE marking—the official text governs actual obligations.

ETSI EN 303 645: the security baseline for consumer IoT

The law says ‘be secure,’ but how does ‘secure’ get implemented? Here you need a followable technical baseline. ETSI EN 303 645^[2] is the consumer-IoT cybersecurity baseline standard published by the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), offering 13 high-level recommendations and a set of specific provisions.

Its three most emphasized recommendations are practically the common-sense floor of IoT security:

1. No universal default passwords—each device gets a unique password, or requires the user to set one at initialization
2. Implement a means to manage vulnerability reports—give researchers a channel to report flaws rather than leaving them unaddressed
3. Keep software updated—provide an update mechanism and state its support period clearly

It is not mandatory law but a set of good-practice baselines, often taken as a reference for ‘demonstrating that a product meets the basic IoT security requirements.’ For a product team, even before it is mandatory, treating EN 303 645 as a self-check list is the most practical way to begin.

The U.S. Cyber Trust Mark: a trust signal from a voluntary label

On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. takes the voluntary-label route. The U.S. Cyber Trust Mark^[3] is a consumer-IoT cybersecurity label led by the FCC, launched by the White House in January 2025.

How it works:

• A product tested by an FCC-recognized lab and meeting the security requirements can display the mark and a QR code
• The QR code links to a registry where consumers can look up the product’s security information—such as the update support period and whether updates are automatic
• Its positioning is ‘to let consumers see at a glance which IoT products are more trustworthy’

A networked light string is consumer IoT—exactly the category this mark targets. Note that this program’s administrator and formal launch schedule are still evolving (for example, the responsible body and the timing for accepting applications), so defer to the FCC’s announcements for the actual status.

The PowerMOS role: leaving the attack surface to the layer responsible for it

On the subject of the IC, an honest division of labor is due here—neither overstated nor evaded.

The main battlefield of cybersecurity compliance is the networked layer—password management, firmware updates and communication encryption for the app, the cloud and the Wi-Fi/Bluetooth module. That layer is the attacker’s target, and it is the real focus of what the CRA, EN 303 645 and the Cyber Trust Mark require.

PowerMOS pixel-control ICs handle the pixel-control drive at the LED layer: they carry address and grayscale data over two power-line wires using a proprietary carrier protocol, and are not themselves networked and expose no external network interface, so they form no network attack surface. Clear layering has one practical benefit—a product team can concentrate its limited security resources on the networked interfaces genuinely exposed to the network, without worrying about the underlying pixel control becoming an extra entry point. To be clear: this is an architectural division of labor, not a claim that the PowerMOS IC has ‘passed’ any of the labels above. See the full model range at the product center.

Further reading: for networking protocols, see Smart-Home Lighting Protocols: From App to LED; for pixel-control architecture, see Two-Wire Addressable Lighting.

References and standards

1. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Cyber Resilience Act — on horizontal cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements. European Parliament and Council.
2. ETSI EN 303 645, CYBER; Cyber Security for Consumer Internet of Things: Baseline Requirements. European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).
3. U.S. Cyber Trust Mark, Voluntary Cybersecurity Labeling Program for Consumer IoT Products. U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

This article is an educational piece on cybersecurity compliance. The names and current status of the cited regulations and labels can be verified in the official catalogs of EUR-Lex, ETSI and the FCC; the official text governs actual obligations. PowerMOS pixel-control ICs use a proprietary carrier protocol optimized for LED pixel control and are not themselves networked.

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